I am an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School. I study the design of legal and political institutions. My research explores corporate misconduct, contract theory, and voting procedures.
[University of Wisconsin] [Twitter] [LinkedIn] [Google Scholar]
Publications
(1) “Designing Remedies to Compensate Plaintiffs for Unobservable Harms.” American Law and Economics Review, 2018. [ALER]
(2) “If Not the Index Funds, Then Who?” Berkeley Business Law Journal, 2020. [BBLJ]
(3) “Profiting from Pollution” Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin, 2023 [Replication Files] [JREG]
(4) “Corporate Liability, Collateral Consequences, and Capital Structure“ (Columbia Business Law Review, 2023) [CBLR] [Featured on ProMarket]
(5) “Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?” (with Edward B. Foley and Scott C. Ganz), (forthcoming, University of Illinois Law Review) [SSRN]
Working Papers
(6) “Mandatory Equity Issuances as a First-Best Solution to Punishing Corporate Misconduct.”
(7) “Norm-Based Enforcement of Promises” (with Rebecca Stone and Alexander Stremitzer).
(8) “The Strong Maximum Circulation Algorithm: A New Method for Aggregating Preference Rankings” (with Scott C. Ganz, Dorit S. Hochbaum, and James B. Orlin)
Academic Affiliations
University of Wisconsin Law School, Assistant Professor, 2021-
ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics, Research Affiliate, 2021- ; Postdoctoral Scholar, 2019-2021
Teaching
Business Organizations, Contract Law, Contract Theory and Design
Education
Ph.D., Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2019
J.D., Stanford Law School, 2018
B.A., Oregon State University, 2011
Coauthors
Ned Foley (Ohio State), Scott Ganz (Georgetown, AEI), Dorit Hochbaum (UC Berkeley), Jim Orlin (MIT), Rebecca Stone (UCLA), Alexander Stremitzer (ETH Zurich)
