I am an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School. I study the design of legal and political institutions. My research explores corporate misconduct, contract theory, and preference aggregation.
(1) “Designing Remedies to Compensate Plaintiffs for Unobservable Harms” American Law and Economics Review, 20(2):460-511, 2018. [ALER]
(2) “If Not the Index Funds, Then Who?” Berkeley Business Law Journal, 17(1):44-90, 2020. [BBLJ]
(3) “Corporate Liability, Collateral Consequences, and Capital Structure“ (forthcoming, Columbia Business Law Review) [SocArXiv]
(4) Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?” (with Edward B. Foley and Scott C. Ganz), (forthcoming, University of Illinois Law Review)
(5) “Do Corporations Profit from Breaking the Law? Evidence from Environmental Violations.” (forthcoming, Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin) [SocArXiv]
(6) “Avoiding Corporate Liability Through Strategic Capital Structure.”
(7) “Norm-Based Enforcement of Promises” (with Rebecca Stone and Alexander Stremitzer).
(8) “A Network Flow Approach to Preference Aggregation” (with Scott C. Ganz, Dorit S. Hochbaum, and James B. Orlin)
University of Wisconsin Law School, Assistant Professor, 2021-
Courses Taught: Contracts, Contract Design, Business Organizations
ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics, Research Affiliate, 2021- ; Postdoctoral Scholar, 2019-2021
Ph.D., Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2019
J.D., Stanford Law School, 2018
B.A., Oregon State University, 2011